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Abstract 
It is well established that adaptation and technological investment in each case may serve as a 
commitment device in international climate politics. This paper for the first time analyzes the 
combined impact of these two strategic variables on global mitigation within a non-
cooperative framework where countries either decide on mitigation before or after adaptation. 
By investment, which is assumed to be made in the first place due to its considerable lead 
time, countries commit to lower national contributions to the global public good of mitigation. 
We find that the sequencing of adaptation before mitigation reinforces this strategic effect of 
technological investments at least for sufficiently similar countries. As a consequence, the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium yields a globally lower level of mitigation and higher global 
costs of climate change when adaptation is decided before mitigation. Besides this theoretical 
contribution, the paper proposes some strategies to combat the unfortunate rush to adaptation 
which can be currently observed in climate politics. 
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1 Motivation
Following the setback of international mitigation e¤orts after the Copenhagen con-
ference of the parties (COP15), adaptation to climate change has gained increasing
attention in UNFCCC negotiations. The COP17 in Durban launched the Green
Climate Fund (GCF) with an explicit stipulation of a balanced allocation of re-
sources for adaptation and mitigation activities (UNFCCC 2013). Many developing
countries involved in the GCF view such allocation to imply a share of funding for
adaptation of at least fty percent with a variation of not more than 10 percentage
points (UNFCCC 2011). At the same time, many developed countries kick-started
adaptation strategies at the national (Biesbroek et al. 2010) and local level (Kent
2012). The taboo on adaptation(Pielke et al. 2007) of the 1990s climate nego-
tiations has since been lifted (The Economist 2008). In fact, according to Berg
(2012), adaptation rushes to overtake mitigation in many current statements on the
future of climate politics. One reason for this shift of attitude is that adaptation is
frequently seen as a low-cost option compared to mitigation. Indeed, the German
Energiewendehighlights the immense infrastructural cost of cutting carbon emis-
sions through the expansion of renewable energy (The Economist 2012). This lends
strong evidence to Yohes early nding on the importance of a mitigative capacity
to mirror the adaptive capacityneeded for e¤ective adaptation (Yohe 2001).
The strategic implications of this prioritization of adaptation e¤orts for interna-
tional climate policy have been neglected in much of the literature. Zehaie (2009)
is one of the rare exceptions. He demonstrated that the sequencing of adaptation
before mitigation has a detrimental e¤ect on the outcome of international negoti-
ations, since countries use domestic adaptation strategically to channel mitigation
e¤orts to foreign countries. Contrary to Zehaie, who focuses on a semi-cooperative
approach, i.e. mitigation is decided under cooperation while adaptation as self-
protectionis chosen non-cooperatively, the present paper departs from the nding
that international negotiations on climate change under the roof of the UNFCCC
do not go far beyond business as usual(Böhringer and Vogt 2003 and 2004). In
fact, we argue that the actual situation of climate change is reected best by a
purely non-cooperative setting and we conrm Zehaies nding that the sequencing
of adaptation before mitigation worsens the overall outcome of global mitigation.
Going beyond the model of Zehaie, we investigate the role of technological in-
vestment as a further decision variable in climate politics. The strategic importance
of private investment in the context of international externalities has been ana-
lyzed from di¤erent perspectives (i.e. Buchholz and Konrad 1994, Stranlund 1996,
Aggarwal and Narayan 2004). In the case of climate change, the main nding is
that countries may strategically decrease their level of investment in order to shift
the burden of mitigation to other countries (Buchholz and Konrad 1994). In other
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words, technological investment may serve as a commitment device in the same way
as advancing adaptation does.
However, the concurrence of these two strategic e¤ects and its joint impact on
mitigation has not yet been analyzed. Since both strategic actions, i.e. increased
adaptation and technological underinvestment, aim at committing to a lower e¤ort in
mitigation, two general outcomes are conceivable a priori: First, the strategic e¤ects
might substitute each other, i.e. a second strategic variable would not alter the level
of mitigation in addition. In such a case, the sequencing of adaptation and mitigation
would be irrelevant to the outcome since strategic technological underinvestment
would induce the same low e¤ort in mitigation anyway. Second, both strategic e¤ects
might support each other, thus resulting in a further deterioration of mitigation
activities. According to this scenario, advancing adaptation would still be a relevant
strategic factor in the countriesdecisions on climate policy.
In our analysis, we demonstrate for su¢ ciently similar countries that both strate-
gic e¤ects in fact add up. Considering the choice of technological investment, the
global level of mitigation is lower when adaptation is advanced. Such a deterioration
in mitigation yields higher total costs at the global level. Consequently, the sequenc-
ing of adaptation in relation to mitigation is a crucial factor in climate politics in
combination with other commitment devices. Our main conclusion from this result
is that a more cautious approach on adaptation in climate politics could be superior
to the current rush to adaptation. The principle of a balanced strategy of mitiga-
tion and adaptationwill be needed to avoid the exacerbation of underinvestment
in mitigation due to strategic behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the economic frame-
work, present the basic model and dene the e¢ ciency benchmark. Moreover, the
sequencing of adaptation, mitigation and investment is discussed. In Section 3, the
subgame-perfect equilibria with regard to mitigation and adaptation are determined
and the consequences of sequencing on total costs are analyzed. Section 4 allows
for the decision on private technological investment and investigates its impact on
the overall outcome, whereas the cases of sequencing adaptation before and after
mitigation are compared. Finally, Section 5 proposes some strategies to combat the
unfortunate rush to adaptationthat can be currently observed in climate politics.
A short conclusion follows.
2 Economic Framework
We regard a static model of climate change in a two-country setting following the
existing literature (see e.g. Zehaie 2009, Buob and Stephan 2011 or Ebert andWelsch
2012). Each country (home and foreign) can reduce its incurred damage costs of
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climate change by two strategies: mitigation M and adaptation A. Mitigation
has the characteristics of a public good as it decreases global damage costs, while
adaptation primarily yields benets at the national level and, thus, is modeled as a
national private good. Unlike the preceding literature, in our model the countries
have available a third strategy: By expenditures for technological investment I a
country enhances its mitigative capacity; i.e. the costs of mitigation decrease. Total
costs accruing from climate change for the home and the foreign country are given
by
T (M;m;A; I) = D(M +m;A) + A+ C(M; I) + I
(1)
t(M;m; a; i) = d(M +m; a) + a+ c(m; i) + i:
Capital (lowercase) letters denote functions and variables of the home (foreign)
country. Home countrys damage costs are expressed by D(M + m;A), which is
twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly convex. Damage costs are decreasing in
(domestic and foreign) mitigation as well as in domestic adaptation with diminishing
marginal returns, i.e. (D1; D2) < 0; (D11; D22) > 0.1 Increasing mitigation entails
a decrease of the marginal e¤ectivity of adaptation and vice versa, i.e. D12 >
0:2 The costs of mitigation C(M; I) are strictly convex, C1;C11 > 0; and crucially
depend on technological investment I in the following way: costs of mitigation
decrease in investment with diminishing marginal returns, i.e. C2  0, and C22 > 0.
Moreover, increasing investment reduces marginal costs of mitigation, and increasing
mitigation raises the e¤ectiveness of investment, i.e. C12 = C21 < 0.3 With regard
to adaptation costs, we take up the reasoning of Ebert and Welsch (2011), who
model the expenditures of adaptation instead of adaptation in physical units due
to the heterogeneity of measures that adaptation comprises. Therefore, adaptation
costs are linear, and we implicitly assume that countries choose an optimal mix of
adaptation measures (see Ebert and Welsch 2011).4 Based on the same rationale,
costs of investment are assumed to be linear as well. The foreign countrys total
1The subscripts 1 (2) denote the partial derivatives of a function with respect to its rst (second)
argument, e.g. D1 = @D@M =
@D
@m and D2 =
@D
@A . Furthermore, since the damage function is assumed
to be strictly convex, we have D11D22  D212 > 0.
2Despite the debate on adaptation and mitigation being complements, we follow the predomi-
nant opinion in the literature of a substitutional relationship between adaptation and mitigation
(see, e.g. Ingham et al. 2005, Lecocq and Shalizi 2007 as well as Pittel and Rübbelke 2013).
3Cf. Buchholz and Konrad (1994) for a similar reasoning. Furthermore, strict convexity implies
C11C22 C212 > 0, and the Inada conditions are assumed to hold: limI!0 C2 =  1, limI!1 C2 = 0.
4Adaptation costs may also depend on technological innovation, but the link between adaptation
costs and technology is considerably weaker than between mitigation costs and technology as
adaptation measures mainly involve the prevention or removal of losses stemming from climate
change. Mitigation, however, inherently depends on the changeover from traditional to low carbon
and energy-e¢ cient technologies (see, e.g. Buchholz and Konrad 1994).
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costs have analogous properties.
In the following analysis, we evaluate how the sequence of the decisions on adap-
tation, mitigation and investment a¤ects the non-cooperative equilibrium where the
e¢ cient allocation serves as a benchmark.
2.1 E¢ ciency Benchmark
In order to achieve the globally e¢ cient allocation, countries minimize aggregate
costs T (M;m;A; I) + t(M;m; a; i). As e¢ ciency requires full control of all vari-
ables, the sequencing of the decisions on investment, mitigation, and adaptation is
irrelevant to the outcome. Thus, the aggregate costs are minimized with respect to
all six variables simultaneously. The corresponding rst-order conditions are
I; i :
A; a :
M;m :
1 + C2 = 0 = 1 + c2
1 +D2 = 0 = 1 + d2
C1 +D1 + d1 = 0 = c1 + d1 +D1:
(2)
For investment and adaptation, the e¢ cient allocation implies equating marginal
costs and the corresponding marginal benets, which both occur on a national
level. Marginal benets of investment are simply given by the related marginal de-
crease in mitigation costs. In case of adaptation, marginal benets are expressed by
the marginal reduction of damage costs. In contrast to these private strategies, mit-
igation as a public good yields global benets. Therefore, in the e¢ cient allocation,
each countrys marginal costs of mitigation are balanced against the sum of marginal
damages (i.e. benets) in both countries. The system of these six equations denes
the globally e¢ cient allocation (M;m; A; a; I; i).
2.2 Sequencing
In contrast to the e¢ cient solution, the chronological order of the countriesdecisions
a¤ects the equilibrium levels of mitigation, adaptation and investment substantively.
In order to analyze the e¤ect of sequencing on the subgame-perfect equilibrium, we
set up two di¤erent idealized sequential games.
Investment in mitigation infrastructure (e.g. power grids) naturally requires a
considerable lead time to become e¤ective. Therefore, we assume that countries
necessarily take the decision on investment in the rst stage. For adaptation and
mitigation, however, there is no established sequencing. Although some authors
argue that, naturally, mitigation is xed before adaptation because of the long term
e¤ects of mitigation (Buob and Stephan 2011, Ebert and Welsch 2012), adaptation
consists of numerous heterogeneous strategies and some of them can also be decided
before mitigation. For instance, there is facilitative adaptation which enhances the
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adaptive capacity of the population (Tol 2005), or adaptation with characteristics of
investment (Zehaie 2009) which both have to be xed in the long term.5 In general,
depending on the type of adaptation, it can be xed before, simultaneously with, or
after mitigation. Furthermore, as everybody expects aggregate mitigation e¤orts to
fall short of the IPCC claims, the focus will turn to adaptation in advance. There-
fore, we regard all possible sequences of adaptation and mitigation to be relevant.
However, we refrain from considering the case of a simultaneous choice of adaptation
and mitigation, since this can be reproduced by the sequential game of deciding on
mitigation before adaptation (Zehaie 2009).6 Hence, we solely investigate the two
sequences depicted in Table 1, adaptation before mitigationand mitigation before
adaptation.
sequencing stage 1 stage 2 stage 3
mitigation before adaptation investment mitigation adaptation
adaptation before mitigation investment adaptation mitigation
Table 1: Sequencing of adaptation, mitigation and investment
3 Adaptation and Mitigation
In this section, we analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria for either sequence by
applying backward induction. We rst solve the last two stages disregarding the
choice of investment and compare the equilibria to the e¢ cient solution. The deci-
sion on investment in the rst stage of the game and its impact on mitigation and
adaptation in the subgame-perfect equilibria follows in Section 4.
3.1 Mitigation before Adaptation
At rst, we analyze the case when mitigation is xed before adaptation. In the third
stage, both countries minimize their total costs with respect to A and a; respectively.
This yields the rst-order conditions
1 +D2 = 0 = 1 + d2; (3)
which are identical to those of the e¢ cient allocation. The optimal choices on
adaptation are independent of the other countrys decision. Thus, both countries
have dominant strategies given the levels of aggregate mitigation xed in the second
stage, i.e. A(M +m) and a(M +m).
In stage 2, countries decide simultaneously on mitigation while anticipating the
levels of adaptation chosen in stage 3. Minimizing T (M;m;A(M + m); I) with
5Auerswald et al. (2011) also consider the case of adaptation being xed before mitigation when
analyzing the impact of risk preferences on climate policy.
6However, this equivalence may not hold if climate funding is regarded (see Heuson et al. 2013).
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respect to M yields the following rst-order condition
C1 +D1 + [1 +D2]| {z } 
=0 eq.(3)
@A
@M
= 0 (4)
for the home country. The analogous condition characterizes the optimal choice
in the foreign country. According to (4), countries choose the level of mitigation
at which marginal costs equal national marginal benets only. Contrary to the
e¢ ciency benchmark, the positive externality of mitigation on the damage of the
neighboring country is not considered in the non-cooperative case. The countries
mitigation e¤orts are strategic substitutes since it can be shown by the implicit
function theorem that  1 < @M
@m
=   D11D22 D212
D22C11+D11D22 D212 < 0:
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3.2 Adaptation before Mitigation
Second, we analyze the sequential game with adaptation being xed before mitiga-
tion. In the third stage, countries decide on mitigation which yields the following
rst-order conditions for home and foreign
C1 +D1 = 0 = c1 + d1: (5)
These conditions can be explained analogously to (4). Again, mitigation of home and
foreign are strategic substitutes.8 The equilibrium level of mitigation also depends
on adaptation and investment.
In stage 2, the countries minimize total costs with respect to their levels of adap-
tation. Considering the equilibrium in stage 3, the following rst-order condition
arises for home
1 +D2 + [C1 +D1]| {z }
=0 eq.(5)
 @M
@A
+D1  @m
@A
= 0: (6)
In contrast to the e¢ ciency benchmark (2), a strategic e¤ect occurs which is rep-
resented by the last term of (6). This term is negative, as D1 < 0 and @m@A > 0
(see Appendix 1), and reects the additional marginal benets of adaptation which
arise when adaptation is xed before mitigation. Since domestic mitigation and
adaptation are substitutes, by increasing adaptation the home country commits to
a lower level of mitigation in the following stage. The foreign country anticipates the
lower level of domestic mitigation and, in response, elevates its e¤ort in mitigation
since domestic and foreign mitigation are strategic substitutes. The home country
7This relation holds due to convexity of the damage function D:
8However, strategic substitutability changes with sequencing in the sense that  1 < dMdm =
  D11C11+D11 < 0: The best response when mitigation is chosen before adaptation is not as elastic as
for the opposite sequencing.
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benets from this response because foreign mitigation reduces the domestic damage.
Consequently, adaptation in stage 2 serves as a commitment device to a lower
mitigation e¤ort and induces an increase in foreign mitigation in stage 3. However,
the global level of mitigation decreases with adaptation as the (direct) e¤ect on
the level of domestic mitigation outweighs the (indirect) one on foreign mitigation:
@[M+m]
@A
< 0.9 The analogous rst-order condition and reasoning hold for the foreign
country.
3.3 Consequences of Advancing Adaptation
Disregarding the choice of investment, we compare the non-cooperative equilibria
in stage 2 and 3. The system of (3) and (4) yields the subgame-perfect equi-
librium (A; a;M;m) where mitigation is chosen before adaptation. For the
reverse sequencing, the system of (5) and (6) yields the subgame-perfect levels
(A4; a4;M4;m4); where adaptation increases due to the strategic e¤ect described
in the previous section. To simplify the analysis, we assume in what follows that
@m
@A
and @M
@a
are approximately constant and, thus, independent of mitigation and
adaptation itself.10
Comparing the two subgame-perfect equilibria gives rise to
Proposition 1 Consequences of advancing adaptation.
i) When the decision on adaptation is advanced, the home and the foreign country
strategically raise their respective levels of adaptation compared to the reverse se-
quencing, (A4; a4) > (A; a):
ii) Due to this increase in adaptation, the global contribution to mitigation in the
subgame-perfect equilibrium where adaptation is chosen before mitigation is lower
than in the opposite sequence: (M4 +m4) < (M +m):
Proof. See Appendix 2.
We can explain this result by the following intuition. Comparing the rst-order
conditions regarding adaptation in the non-cooperative cases, (3) and (6), it can be
found that additional benets of adaptation arise when it is chosen before mitigation.
As marginal costs of adaptation remain unchanged, each country chooses a higher
level of adaptation compared to the opposite sequencing. Regarding mitigation, the
rst-order conditions, (4) and (5), are identical. Strategic increases in adaptation in
home and foreign have opposing e¤ects on the respective levels of mitigation. On
the one hand, a higher level of domestic adaptation induces a decrease in marginal
9See Appendix 1 and cf. Zehaie (2009) for a similar result.
10To be precise, this requires the third-order derivatives of C() and D() to be su¢ ciently small
or ideally zero which will be true for (quadratic) polynomial costs of degree two. In case of arbitrary
cost functions we then apply their second-order Taylor approximation.
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benet of domestic mitigation. On the other hand, an opposing indirect e¤ect
arises due to the increase in adaptation and the involved decrease in mitigation in
the neighboring country. For su¢ ciently similar countries, the direct e¤ect always
outweighs the indirect one. However, in the case of highly asymmetric countries,
the partial compensation of the decrease in mitigation through the neighboring
country might outweigh the direct e¤ect. Therefore, the levels of mitigation do
not necessarily decline in both countries due to advancing adaptation. However,
the global level of mitigation is denitely lower when adaptation is xed rst since
crowding out is just partial.11
Next, let us consider the consequences of the di¤erent sequences on global costs.
We start by comparing the non-cooperative equilibrium without any strategic e¤ects
to the e¢ ciency benchmark (M;m; A; a). This gives rise to
Proposition 2 Underprovision of mitigation as a public good.
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium where mitigation is xed before adaptation, the
global level of mitigation is ine¢ ciently low: (M +m) < (M +m):
Proof. Domestic mitigation decreases the foreign countrys total costs and vice
versa, i.e.
 
@t
@M
; @T
@m

< 0. As this positive externality of mitigation is not considered
in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, mitigation is ine¢ ciently low.
Proposition 3 Adaptation as a substitute for mitigation.
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium where mitigation is xed before adaptation, the
level of adaptation exceeds that of the e¢ cient allocation: (A; a) > (A; a):
Proof. For both, the e¢ cient solution and the subgame-perfect equilibrium where
mitigation is xed rst, the best choice of adaptation is characterized by identical
rst-order conditions (2) and (3). As mitigation in the subgame-perfect equilibrium
is lower than in the e¢ cient allocation, the marginal benet of adaptation is com-
paratively higher in the non-cooperative case. Since marginal costs of adaptation
remain unchanged, the subgame-perfect level of adaptation must exceed the e¢ cient
level.
Corollary 1 Global ranking of the subgame-perfect equilibria.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium where mitigation is xed before adaptation yields a
globally superior result relative to the subgame-perfect equilibrium where adaptation
is chosen before mitigation:
(M +m) > (M +m) > (M4 +m4) and (A; a) < (A; a) < (A4; a4):
11See Appendix 2 for the formal analysis of these results.
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Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 1-3.
When adaptation is xed before mitigation, each country uses adaptation as a
commitment device in order to incentivize the neighboring country to increase its
contribution to the public good of mitigation. In other words, each country tries
to improve its national situation at the expense of its neighbor. However, in sum,
the possibility of strategic adaptation yields a globally lower level of mitigation as
the decline in domestic mitigation is greater than the reverse indirect e¤ect on the
neighbor countrys mitigation. Consequently, the subgame-perfect equilibrium when
adaptation is xed before mitigation is globally inferior to the opposite sequence of
decisions. If countries are su¢ ciently similar, a global decrease in mitigation implies
that the e¤ort in mitigation of each country declines. As a consequence, both
countries denitely fall short of achieving their strategic aim to improve the own
situation on expense of the other country. Hence, the case of advancing adaptation
yields a Pareto-inferior result for su¢ ciently similar countries.
Our results show that the currently ongoing political prioritization of adaptation
is globally counterproductive. Due to the ensuing strategic increase in adaptation,
the global level of mitigation, which is already ine¢ ciently low, su¤ers from an
additional downgrade. Therefore, the problem of the underprovision of the global
public good of mitigation impends to get worse.
4 Investment
In this section, we focus on the investment decision in the rst stage and its conse-
quences on the subgame-perfect equilibria. In particular, we consider the question of
whether the strategic choice on investment will support or countervail the strategic
e¤ect of advancing adaptation which was analyzed in Section 3.
4.1 Mitigation before adaptation
Anticipating stages 2 and 3, the home country minimizes total costs with respect
to I: This yields the following rst-order condition for home (and analogously for
foreign)
C2 + 1 + [1 +D2]| {z }
=0 eq. (3)
 @A
@I
+ [C1 +D1]| {z }
=0 eq. (4)
 @M
@I
+D1  @m
@I
= 0: (7)
In comparison to the e¢ ciency benchmark (2), there arises a strategic e¤ect which
is represented by the last term in (7). This e¤ect is positive since @m
@I
< 0 (see
Appendix 3). Consequently, additional marginal costs of investment arise while
marginal benets remain unchanged, and the home country strategically lowers its
level of investment. This can be explained as follows: As investment and mitiga-
10
tion are complements in the sense of @M
@I
> 0, lower investment serves as a device
for committing to a lower level of domestic mitigation. As domestic and foreign
mitigation are strategic substitutes, the foreign country increases its level of mit-
igation in the second stage and the home country benets. However, the net ef-
fect of a decline in investment on the global level of mitigation is negative since
@[M+m]
@I
=  C12  c11= det2 > 0 (see Appendix 3).
4.2 Adaptation before mitigation
In case adaptation is xed before mitigation, the home countrys rst order condition
with respect to I reads
C2 + 1 +

1 +D2 +D1
@m
@A

| {z }
=0 eq. (6)
 @A
@I
+ [C1 +D1]| {z }
=0 eq. (5)
 @M
@I
+D1  @m
@I
= 0: (8)
This condition is similar to (7), and therefore, the reasoning is analogous: Investment
serves as a commitment device to a lower level of mitigation which in turn raises the
foreign mitigation e¤ort. Again, mitigation in the home and the foreign country are
strategic substitutes and the overall e¤ect of a decline in investment on the global
level of mitigation is negative as @[M+m]
@I
> 0 (see Appendix 3). The analogous
rst-order condition and reasoning hold for the foreign country.
4.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria with Investment
Eqs. (3), (4) and (7) determine the equilibrium (M;m; A; a; I; i) in which miti-
gation is chosen before adaptation, whereas the equilibrium (M4;m4; A4; a4; I4; i4)
with adaptation before mitigation is dened by (5), (6) and (8). Comparing these
subgame-perfect equilibria with the e¢ cient allocation (M;m; A; a; I; i) gives
rise to
Proposition 4 Reduced mitigation e¤ort due to underinvestment in technology.
Independently of the sequential choice of mitigation and adaptation, countries un-
derinvest in technology relative to the e¢ cient solution, i.e. (I; i), (I4; i4) <
(I; i). This strategic underinvestment induces a globally lower level of mitiga-
tion in each subgame-perfect equilibrium compared to the e¢ cient allocation, i.e.
(M +m); (M4 +m4) < (M +m):
Proof. We compare the rst-order conditions with regard to investment, (7) and (8),
to the e¢ cient solution (2). Due to the strategic e¤ect in terms of investment in (7)
and (8), marginal benets of investment decrease and countries choose a lower level
of investment compared to the e¢ ciency benchmark, i.e. both (I; i) and (I4; i4)
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fall short of (I; i). In the subsequent stages, lower levels of investment induce
higher marginal costs of mitigation. Moreover, in accordance with Proposition 2
and Corollary 1, the positive externality of mitigation is not considered in the non-
cooperative cases. Thus, for the rst-order conditions with regard to mitigation, (4)
and (5), to hold, the global levels of mitigation in the subgame-perfect equilibria
must be lower in comparison with the e¢ cient allocation, i.e. (M + m); (M4 +
m4) < (M +m).
Independent of the sequence of mitigation and adaptation, strategic underinvest-
ment in the rst stage serves as a commitment device to a lower level of mitigation
for both countries.12 With respect to sequencing, we observe the following results.
Proposition 5 Sequencing of adaptation before mitigation remains globally infe-
rior.
For su¢ ciently similar (i.e. symmetric and slightly asymmetric) countries, the
subgame-perfect equilibrium depends on sequencing in the following way.
i) When adaptation is advanced, both the level of investment and mitigation are
reduced; i.e. I4 < I and M4 < M. This is accompanied by an increase in adap-
tation A4 > A.
ii) The choice of adaptation before mitigation is globally inferior; i.e. M4 < M <
M:
Proof. See Appendix 4 for part i), part ii) is obvious.
Provided that countries are su¢ ciently similar, the levels of investment are lower
when adaptation is advanced, i.e. the magnitude of underinvestment is intensied.
Consequently, the global level of mitigation is lower, and, in accordance with Corol-
lary 1, the resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium for su¢ ciently similar countries
with adaptation being xed before mitigation remains globally inferior to the re-
verse sequencing.13 Intuitively, this result can be explained by the e¤ect of strategic
adaptation, which causes a lower level of mitigation. Due to this lower demandfor
mitigation, marginal benets of technological investments decrease, and less invest-
ments are made in the subgame-perfect equilibrium where adaptation is xed before
mitigation.
Therefore, accounting for up-front investment decisions conrms the result of
Section 3.3 for su¢ ciently similar countries. Promoting early action in adaptation
increases the global costs stemming from climate change. E¢ ciency su¤ers from
adaptive measures in advance.
12Following Ulph (1996), we assume that - within any one-shot game - investment in technology
is irreversible and thus allows for credibly committing to specic behaviors (here: mitigation e¤ort)
that are a¤ected by the investment in subsequent stages.
13The impact of sequencing on investments for highly asymmetric countries, however, cannot be
determined unambiguously.
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5 Policies to Combat Strategic Incentives in Se-
quencing
The chronological order to decide on mitigation versus adaptation does not fol-
low a natural logicmuch in contrast to investment, which has to be taken prior
to actions of mitigation to enhance the capabilities to engage in climate protec-
tion. In the early period of climate change negotiations advancing Copenhagens
COP15, the order was xed in a silent international consensus as mitigation before
adaptationwhich was labeled the taboo on adaptation(Pielke 2007). This has
since been lifted and due to the missing progress in combating climate change, the
political focus seems to shift towards adaptation before mitigation. Accordingly,
developed countries have currently elaborated detailed plans of adaptation to cli-
mate change (e.g. European Commission 2013, ICCATF 2011) and the UNFCCC
national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) provide funding for the urgent
needs of adaptation for least developed countries (UNFCCC 2007). These plans on
adaptation provide important information to improve climate change resilience, but
they might reverse the unspoken orderof decisions of adaptation and mitigation.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the order of mitigation before adapta-
tionis strictly preferable in a non-cooperative international context. In as much as
the hidden agenda of Kyoto could be reinstalled, i.e. adaptation decisions could be
postponed to a period after mitigation has been decided, we should do so in order to
avoid aggravating strategic decision-making and globally higher costs. However, this
will be di¢ cult in practice as there is no open agenda process on mitigation versus
adaptation. The previous taboo on adaptationwas more an emotional mind-set of
negotiators in the past than a principle enshrined into the UNFCCC.
There are several ways to combat the undesirable consequences of sequencing
adaptation before mitigation, which each in itself does not resolve the problem of
strategic incentives but may contribute to control it. They would each need some
kind of implicit collaboration of countries in form of funding which goes beyond
the framework of non-cooperation assumed in this paper. However, since funding
under Post-Kyoto framework has been agreed independently of targets of adapta-
tion and mitigation specically the fast track nance after the Cancun agreement
(2010-2012) we could consider non-cooperation in terms of mitigation and adap-
tation combined with implicit cooperation in terms of funding. As demonstrated
theoretically by Heuson et al. (2013), several instruments of climate funding could
yield Pareto-improvements for donor and recipient countries. Consequently, fund-
ing might induce an implicit cooperation. The green climate funding is currently
the single most progressing agenda item of UNFCCC to structure an implicit order
of decision making on mitigation and adaptation. The Cancun agreement on the
13
Green Climate Fund in particular urges decisions on adaptation and decisions on
mitigation to be taken simultaneously. Such a parallel funding would prevent to
focus on adaptation only. Furthermore, when climate funding is subject to a bal-
anced allocationprovision such as the GCF, it will set an upper bound for strategic
underinvestment in mitigation. Similarly, technology funds which are directed to-
wards mitigation in developing countries such as the Clean Technology Fund of the
World Bank (e.g. CIF 2103 and World Bank 2008), or Green Stimulus Programs (cf.
Barbier 2010) which enhance investments in low carbon development in developed
countries or emerging marketscountries are potential means to guide us into the
right direction to avoid the unfortunate current rush to adaptation.
6 Conclusion
In recent years, adaptation to climate change has gained increasing attention both
at the national and international level. For example, national adaptation strategies
have been elaborated and diverse international adaptation funds have been launched.
These developments demonstrate that the decision of adaptation is likely to be
advanced on the political agenda. In the present paper, we investigate the economic
consequences of this current shift in priority from mitigation to adaptation.
When adaptation is chosen before mitigation, countries strategically intensify
their expenditures on adaptation in order to shift some costs of mitigation to the
neighboring country. From a unilateral perspective, this strategic behavior might
improve the economic situation of a country (see Zehaie 2009, BMF 2010 and Auer-
swald et al. 2011). However, the global level of mitigation e¤ectively declines.
This paper further analyzes the subgame-perfect equilibria where mitigation is
chosen before and after adaptation, respectively, in comparison to the e¢ ciency
benchmark. Advancing the decision on adaptation in both countries yields a glob-
ally inferior subgame-perfect allocation relative to the case when mitigation is xed
before adaptation. In other words, global costs of climate change rise if the decision
on adaptation is advanced.
In a second step, we investigate the role of investment in technology which is
essential for a countrys mitigative capacity. As the German Energiewendeillus-
trates, immense investments in infrastructure are necessary for the transmission to
a low-carbon energy supply. The considerable lead time of investment requires that
this decision is taken in advance of both mitigation and adaptation, and, therefore,
investment serves as a commitment device in order to shift the burden of mitigation
to the neighboring country. Comparing the resulting subgame-perfect equilibria to
the e¢ ciency benchmark, two main conclusions arise: First, due to strategic un-
derinvestment, the global level of mitigation decreases in either case of sequencing.
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Consequently, in case of upfront investment, the problem of underprovision of mit-
igation becomes even more serious. Second, it can be shown for su¢ ciently similar
countries that the level of investment in the subgame-perfect equilibrium is even
lower when adaptation is taken in advance than in case of the opposite sequencing.
Thus, regarding investment, the negative e¤ect of advancing adaptation on global
mitigation is even intensied and global costs of climate change increase further.
In sum, the current shift of attention towards adaptation in national and interna-
tional climate policies reinforces the problem of the voluntary provision of mitigation
from an economic point of view. Therefore, we suggest to keep the political focus on
enhancing mitigation, or at least bind the progress on adaptation on parallel e¤orts
in mitigation in the framework of a balanced strategy. As investment naturally
must be taken in advance, this sequence cannot be inuenced politically. Neverthe-
less, it might be useful to strengthen the role of technology funds or Green Stimulus
Programs.
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Appendix 1: Comparative statics for adaptation and mitigation
In case adaptation is chosen before mitigation, the impact adaptation has on mitiga-
tion in the third stage can be determined by di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions
of mitigation in home and foreign with respect to adaptation14 
dM
dm
!
=   1
det1
 
[c11 + d11]D12  D11d12
 d11D12 [C11 +D11] d12
! 
dA
da
!
: (A.1)
From (A.1) it can be seen that domestic adaptation has a negative (positive) impact
on domestic (foreign) mitigation, @M
@A
=   [c11 + d11]  D12= det1 < 0 and @m@A =
d11  D12= det1 > 0. However, as @[M+m]@A =  c11  D12= det1 < 0 the overall e¤ect
of adaptation on global mitigation is negative. The impact of foreign adaptation is
analogous.
Appendix 2: Sequencing of adaptation and mitigation
In order to determine the impact the sequencing of adaptation and mitigation has
on the subgame-perfect equilibria in stage 2 (including stage 3), we have to analyze
the comparative statics of the choices on (M;m;A; a). The rst-order conditions
with respect to mitigation, (4) and (5), are identical in either case of sequencing,
but the optimal choices on adaptation, (3) and (6) di¤er with respect to the strategic
term. However, we can integrate both in a single approach such that the rst-order
conditions for home and foreign, respectively, are given by
1 +D2 + D1
@m
@A
= 0 (A.2)
1 + d2 + d1
@M
@a
= 0: (A.3)
Here, the parameter  serves to distinguish the di¤erent cases of sequencing on
adaptation and mitigation. If mitigation is chosen before adaptation, we have  = 0,
and in the opposite case  = 1. For convenience we have assumed that @m
@A
and @M
@a
are approximately constant and, thus, independent of mitigation and adaptation
itself.
Proof for part i) of Proposition 1: In order to analyze the impact of se-
quencing, we totally di¤erentiate the rst-order conditions (A.2) and (A.3) of the
decisions on adaptation regarding 
14The determinant det1 = [c11 + d11][C11 + D11]   d11D11 is always positive. Thus, the Nash
equilibrium at that stage is stable and unique, cf. Tirole (1988, p. 324).
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Inserting (A.1) and rearranging terms yields
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1CCCCCA
det2
(A.5)

 
D1
@m
@A
d1
@M
@a
!
d:
All elements of the 2x2-matrix above are positive and both elements of the vector
are negative. Furthermore, it can be shown (after some tedious math) that the
appropriate determinant det2 is positive as well. Hence, the levels of adaptation in
home and foreign increase in , i.e. @A
@
> 0 and @a
@
> 0. Therefore, the equilibrium
levels of adaptation are higher in each country when adaptation is chosen before
mitigation, i.e. A > A :
Proof for part ii) of Proposition 1: The rst-order conditions with respect
to mitigation, (4) and (5), are identical and do not directly depend on the sequencing
of adaptation and mitigation (i.e. on ). Thus, mitigation in home and foreign is
just indirectly e¤ected by sequencing, which can be represented by @M
@
= @M
@A
@A
@
+
@M
@a
@a
@
and, accordingly, @m
@
= @m
@A
@A
@
+ @m
@a
@a
@
: Due to opposing e¤ects of increasing
adaptation in home and foreign on mitigation (see Appendix 1), the signs of @M
@
and
@m
@
cannot be determined unambiguously for asymmetric countries. However, the
overall impact of sequencing adaptation before mitigation yields a globally lower level
of mitigation since @[M+m]
@
= @[M+m]
@A
@A
@
+ @[M+m]
@a
@a
@
< 0 due to @[M+m]
@A
; @[M+m]
@a
< 0
(cf. Appendix 1). Thus, the total level of mitigation in equilibrium decreases with
 2 [0; 1] such that M +m < [M +m]. Therefore, at least in one of the two
countries the level of mitigation is lower when adaptation is advanced. Moreover,
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for symmetric countries it can be shown that @M
@
= @m
@
=  C11D12
det1
@A
@
< 0, i.e.
mitigation in both home and foreign is smaller when adaptation is advanced. As all
best-response functions are continuous, the same result holds true even for slightly
asymmetric countries.
Appendix 3: Comparative statics considering investment
We determine the strategic e¤ect of investment on mitigation by comparative statics.
Totally di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions of the decisions on mitigation of
home and foreign, (4) and, respectively, (5), yields 
C11 +D11 D11
d11 c11 + d11
! 
dM
dm
!
+
 
D12 0
0 d12
! 
dA
da
!
(A.6)
=  
 
C12 0
0 c12
! 
dI
di
!
:
In order to substitute (dA; da), we totally di¤erentiate the rst-order conditions
of the decisions on adaptation, (3) and (6), for a given sequencing (i.e. d = 0)
 
dA
da
!
=  
0BBB@
[D12+D11 @m@A ]
[D22+D12 @m@A ]
[D12+D11 @m@A ]
[D22+D12 @m@A ]
[d12+d11 @M@a ]
[d22+d12 @M@a ]
[d12+d11 @M@a ]
[d22+d12 @M@a ]
1CCCA
 
dM
dm
!
; (A.7)
which shows that adaptation is a substitute to mitigation independent of its origin
and sequencing.
Substituting (dA; da) from (A.7) in (A.6), rearranging terms and solving the
equation system for the change in mitigation, yields
 
dM
dm
!
=
 
0BBB@
C12
h
c11 +
d11d22 [d12]2
d22+d12
@M
@a
i
  c12[D11D22 [D12]
2]
D22+D12
@m
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 C12[d11d22 [d12]
2]
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det3
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(A.8)
where determinant det3 =
h
C11 +
D11D22 D212
D22+D12
@m
@A
i h
c11 +
d11d22 d212
d22+d12
@M
@a
i
 
h
D11D22 D212
D22+D12
@m
@A
i
h
d11d22 d212
d22+d12
@M
@a
i
> 0 is always positive such that the Nash equilibrium is again sta-
ble and unique (Tirole 1988).
Comparative statics show that domestic investment is a strategic complement
(substitute) to domestic (foreign) mitigation, @M
@I
=   C12
det3
h
c11 +
d11d22 [d12]2
d22+d12
@M
@a
i
> 0
and @m
@I
= C12
det3
h
d11d22 [d12]2
d22+d12
@M
@a
i
< 0. Moreover, investment encourages mitigation e¤orts
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globally @(M+m)
@I
=  C12  c11= det3 > 0: The rst two relations directly follow from
the convexity of the damage functions, i.e. d11d22   [d12]2 > 0. Furthermore, the
denominators are positive irrespective of the sequential choice of adaptation and
mitigation since @M
@a
; @m
@A
> 0 (see Appendix 1).
Appendix 4: Comparative statics and sequencing considering investment
To compare the e¤ects of investment in the two di¤erent sequential games, we eval-
uate the subgame-perfect investment levels. In the symmetric case, three rst-order
conditions characterize the entire equilibrium which, in turn depends on sequencing

1 + C2(M; I) +D1(2M ;A)  @m@I = 0
C1(M; I) +D1(2M;A) = 0
1 +D2(2M;A) +  D1(2M;A)  @m@A = 0 
(A.9)
These three equations determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium in symmetric
adaptation A; mitigation M and investment I; while  enables us to distinguish
between the di¤erent types of sequencing. For convenience we have assumed that
@m
@I
and @m
@A
are approximately constant and, thus, independent of investments, mit-
igation, and adaptation itself. Totally di¤erentiating (A.9) yields
0BBBBBB@
dA
d
dM
d
dI
d
1CCCCCCA =  
0BBBBBB@
D12
@m
@I
C21 + 2D11
@m
@I
C22
D12 C11 + 2D11 C12
D22 + D12
@m
@A
2

D21 + D11
@m
@A

0
1CCCCCCA
 10B@ 00
D1
@m
@A
1CA

(A.10)
Thus, the elements of the cofactor matrix corresponding to (A.10) determine the
signs of the comparative statics15
15Cf. Sydsaeter et al. (2005, 4f). For a stable equilibrium the determinant of the matrix in
(A.10) is positive.
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sign
0BBBBBB@
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1CCCCCCA = sign
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
C11C22   C212| {z }
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+ 2D11|{z}
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
| {z }
>0
 D12|{z}
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C22   C12@m
@I

| {z }
>0
D12|{z}
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C21   C11@m
@I

| {z }
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1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA

(A.11)
The signs are unambiguous: dA=d > 0; dM=d < 0 and dI=d < 0: This can be
shown (after some tedious math) by substituting @m=@I from appendix 3, inserting
the denition of det3; and rearranging terms such that

C21   C11 @m@I

< 0 and
C22   C12 @m@I

> 0: Again, continuity implies that the results hold true even for
slightly asymmetric countries.
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